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Plaintiff, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee Branson G. Neff ("Plaintiff," "Appellant"
or "Branson"), through counsel MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C., hereby submits this
Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee.
INTRODUCTION
Following a recent stipulation between the parties during the pendency of this
appeal, only three issues remain to be resolved. The first two issues are presented by
Branson: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (the "JNOV") with respect to the Jury's specific award of attorney fees as special
damages for both Branson's claim for slander of title and his claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, and (2) whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary
judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim. The final issue is presented by
Defendant, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant Marvin G. Neff ("Defendant," "Appellee," or
"Marvin"): (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Marvin was
not the "prevailing party," thereby denying his request for certain of his attorney fees.
If, after reading Marvin's opening brief, the Justices' are left scratching their
heads, they are not alone. The primary cause of confusion is Marvin's improper attempt
to relitigate issues already resolved at trial. Instead of presenting the facts in accordance
with the appropriate standards of review (which, with respect to all the remaining issues
on appeal, require recitation of the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
Branson), Marvin continues to present his version of the facts, as though there had been
no trial and no Jury verdict.
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A
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is any basis in the evidence" to support the Jury's verdict. ii'\nfhc\\\nfc
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City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). Branson easily meets this
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can do is show that there were disputed issues of fact, f low ever, those facts were
necessarily resolved in iu\ VM wj Branson. Indeed, (he Jury necessarily rejected the very
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retry ihc facts." Crookston
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Independently; but no less significant, M a r v i n ' s failure to carry his burden to
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the effect of advancing the law on standard of review, it should b e enforced against
Marvin.
As to the second issue on appeal Ihr r n m l
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judgment if there was even, a single genuine issue of material fact. A s explained in
I->ruh.:.or 's opening Dnci, there were m a n y genuine issues of material fact that precluded
entry of part ial sumniarv judjunnil

I \\v\v w n v also fundamental errors in flu dial

c o n n ' s legal analysis, which this Court reviews de novo, and which should be resolved
h> S a n s o n s favor as a matter of law.
Witl 11 'espect to tl ic I! It ial issi le oi I appeal. tl le Coi n I: it i in ist affii I i i tl :ie ti: ial con i.i f s
prevailing party determination, and resulting denial of M a r v i n ' s request for att< ••• -v • ' -.

unless the Court finds that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court considered
and rejected Marvin's argument, examined appropriate considerations, entered sufficient
findings, and should not be reversed on that issue. Thus, Marvin is not even close to
meeting his burden for a reversal.
Finally, because Marvin's brief is at odds with clear and controlling Utah law, and
because it appears to be a continuation of his litigation strategy to repeatedly reargue
already adjudicated issues, Branson respectfully requests double his costs and his
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal.
In sum, Branson respectfully requests that the Court (1) reverse the JNOV and rule
that Branson is entitled to his attorney fees as special damages on his slander of title and
breach of fiduciary duty claims, in accordance with the Jury's verdict; (2) reverse the trial
court's grant of partial summary judgment on Branson's malicious prosecution claim; (3)
affirm the trial court's prevailing party determination and resulting denial of Marvin's
attorney fee request; and (4) award Branson double costs and reasonable attorney fees on
appeal.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE JNOV BECAUSE AMPLE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JURY VERDICT AND MARVIN CANNOT
SHOW OTHERWISE.
In response to the first issue on appeal, Marvin claims the JNOV should remain in

place because Branson has failed to marshal the evidence against the Jury's verdict.
However, not only has Marvin misstated and turned on their head the parties' respective

3

burdens on •"-

- i • • •'• • •• • •
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the JNOV. By contrast, Marvin, as the party who seeks to uphold the J NOV, has not
even come close to meeting his burden.
A.

Marvin Failed
Fatal Defect
1

oiitiiuu

„
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Marvin Carries the Burden to Marshal All the Evidence Supporting
the Jury's Verdict,

I 'JC iii'M «-• 'n >n appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the JNOV with

Branson's claim for slander of title and his claim for breach of (idtiatin duly

V. Ihr

party who sought and obtained M O V below; see R. 1022-102l>. and who now seeks to
. •

;|-pe.:j.
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:. . .-uiu.;. ; . nuiiMLu aij lire Luucncc that
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(Utah 1991) ("To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict,
the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and
then demonstrate that I h r r s u l r n u 1 is insullinenl ,.1'1 11 . L'w.'d in (lie li^Itl .nosl laxoivihle
to the verdict." (emphasis added)); Holmstrom v. C.R. En^LuuL ///«.-.. 2000 UT -\pp 239,
m

\ JO, vS \3.5i\ 282 (requiring party seeking JNOV to "marshal ,311 the evidence supporting
'•

«• •'

••

•—' - uiuiioi ^upp<^

!

. .:..i.:

v^sphases adovU)

(additional quotations and citations omitted)); cf. Walker v. I\trish Client f '<»., " i 4 /''.-J
1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("We review the grant of a j.n.o.v. for correctness,

1

In a belated effort to explain his misinterpretation of his marshalling Inn den, Man in
now claims to be the nonmoving party on his own motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. Obviously, as the party seeking the .JNOV, Marvin w?s the ^ ^ ; no party.

4

affording no deference to the trial court"). By contrast, as the party challenging the trial
court's grant of JNOV, Branson's burden is not to marshal the evidence but instead to
establish "whether there is any basis in the evidence" to support the jury's verdict.
Braithewaite v. West Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1996) (emphasis
added). Thus, contrary to Marvin's assertion, it is Marvin who carries the marshalling
burden on the first issue on appeal.2
2.

Marvin Wholly Failed to Meet This Heavy Burden.

Marshalling the evidence is a critical obligation for Marvin, because the Utah
Supreme Court does "not sit to retry the facts." Crooks tonn 817 P.2d at 800. The burden
to marshal is a heavy one:
When challenging a jury's verdict, a party must "marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State
v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, % 13, 25 P.3d 985 (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Put differently, a party incurs an obligation to marshal all of the
evidence that arguably supports the jury's conclusion. This means that it
must marshal "every scrap" of evidence that supports the jury's finding.
Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, If 11, 51 P.3d 724. It also requires that
the party contesting the verdict assume the role of "devil's advocate." Id.
The party challenging the jury's verdict must therefore temporarily remove
its own prejudices and fully embrace "the adversary's position." Id.
Harding v. Bell 2002 UT 108, f 19, 57 P.3d 1093 (emphases added).

2

The authority cited by and relied upon by Marvin stands for the same proposition - the
party who challenges a jury's verdict carries the marshalling burden. See Fitz v. Synthes,
199 UT 103, Tflf 8-9, 990 P.2d 391 ("On appeal, this court reviews the evidence presented
at trial in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and will reverse a trial court's
decision [denying JNOV] only if the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict.
Moreover, the [party seeking JNOV] has the burden of marshaling the evidence in
support of the verdict and then showing that it is insufficient.").

5

In the face of his necessary and weighty burden, both at the trial court and on
appeal, Marvin "has made no attempt to marshal the evidence in support of the Jury
finding."3 Crookston, 817 P.2d at 800. Worse, Marvin has merely argued selected
evidence favorable to his position, which approach "does not begin to meet the
marshalling burden [Marvin] must carry." Id_ Thus, Marvin has wholly failed to meet
his heavy marshalling burden.
The consequence of Marvin's failure to marshal the evidence is dispositive,
requiring reversal of the JNOV and reinstatement of the Jury's verdict. See Mountain
States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 55 K 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("When the duty to
marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the
findings and accept the findings as valid."); see also DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d
1353, 1359 (Utah 1994) (affirming jury verdict and denial of motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict as a matter of law because moving party failed to marshal all
evidence supporting the verdict). Because Marvin failed to satisfy his marshalling
obligation (both on appeal and at the trial-court level), the Jury's verdict must be restored.
B.

The Jury Did Not Mistakenly Answer Questions 6(C) and 8(C) of the
Jury's Special Verdict.

Following a two-week trial on the merits, the Jury's specific imperative was "that
Marvin should be held to pay Branson's attorney fees" as special damages for Branson's
slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims, for which the Jury found Marvin

Although Branson pointed out Marvin's failure to marshal the evidence supporting the
Jury's verdict at the trial court level, see Appellant's Brief at 29-30, Marvin did not even
respond to that argument or attempt to marshal at the appellate-court level.

fi

liable "by clear and convincing evidence." R. 9789-91 (emphases added). Faced with
that unambiguous verdict, Marvin resorts to the simplest, yet least reasonable argument the Jury mistakenly answered those questions.4 Although the trial court accepted
Marvin's ignoble argument by granting the JNOV, the argument is simply not well taken.
First, both in support of his argument below and on appeal, Marvin improperly
interprets all facts and inferences against the Jury's verdict. However, in the context of a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Court must "View the evidence and
all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to that verdict and recite the facts
accordingly.'" Mueller v. Allen* 2005 UT App 477,1} 2, 128 P.3d 18 (emphasis added)
(quoting State v. Allen * 2005 UT 11,12, 108 P.3d 730). Thus, the prism through which
Marvin describes the facts is incorrect, contrary to well settled law, and should be
rejected.
Second, Marvin's argument is at odds with the plain meaning of the Jury's
answers to the Special Verdict. See R. 9789-91. With respect to both Branson's slander
of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Jury specifically found Marvin liable "by
clear and convincing evidence." R. 9789-90. After it answered each liability question,
the Jury was instructed to proceed to the question whether "Marvin should be held to pay
Branson's attorney fees." R. 9790-91. As with the issue of liability, the Jury answered
affirmatively the question of whether Marvin should be held to pay Branson's attorney
fees. SeeR. 9790-91.
4

Paradoxically, Marvin claims both that his "JNOV motion did not attack the evidence,"
and "that there was no competent evidence to support the jury verdict." [Brief of
Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 59 & 60].
7

Were it to accept Marvin's argument, the Court would improperly and
unjustifiably render superfluous the Jury's verdict "that Marvin should be held to pay
Branson's attorney fees" as special damages for Branson's slander of title and breach of
fiduciary duty claims. R. 9790-91. The Court is and must be highly deferential to jury
verdicts. Indeed, the Court "defer[s] to the Jury and evaluate[s] the evidence in a light
favorable to the verdict." Hodges v. Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 15 h 156 (Utah 1991).
The Court should not construe the Jury's verdict contrary to its plain meaning.
Third, Marvin's argument contradicts the Jury instructions. Those instructions
specifically and expressly charged the Jury to determine whether Branson was entitled to
special damages in the form of attorney fees on his slander of title and breach of fiduciary
duty claims. See R. 9777 ("Attorney fees may be recoverable as special damages [for
slander of title c l a i m ] . . . . " (emphasis added)); R. 9771 ("If either party prevails on his
claim for breach of fiduciary duty, he may be awarded damages for those losses . . .
including his attorney's fees incurred

(emphasis added)).

Additionally, the Jury instructions specifically and expressly stated that the
amount of those special damages would be subsequently determined by the court. See
R. 9771 ("If you chose to award attorney's fees as damages herein, the amount of the
attorney's fees will be determined later by the court." (emphasis added)). In other words,
while Branson's entitlement to attorney fees was an issue for the Jury, the amount of
Branson's special damages in the form of attorney fees was not for the Jury to determine.
Marvin did not object or otherwise take exception to the Jury instructions. Thus,
Marvin waived any objection thereto. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah

8

1998) (noting that when defense counsel approved a jury instruction as given, he waived
"any objection on appeal"); Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237, Tj 17, 74 P.3d 635
("Generally, if a party fails to object to a jury instruction, that party waives any objection
thereto.").
Fourth, the crux of Marvin's argument appears to be that because damages are a
required element of the slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims, the Jury's
verdict awarding attorney fees must have been in error. That argument, however, ignores
controlling substantive law underlying the Jury instructions. For instance, it is well
settled in Utah that a party may recover attorney fees as special damages for a slander of
title claim. See, e.g., Bass v. Planned Memt. Servs., Inc., 761 P.2d 566, 569 (Utah 1998)
(stating that "attorney fees have been held to be recoverable as special damages"); Dowse
v. Doris Trust Co. , 116 Utah 106, 208 P.2d 956, 959 (1949) ("The action of slander of
title is based on a wrongful act but for which the plaintiff would not have had to incur any
expense, either for costs or for attorney's fees.").
Likewise, Utah courts have made clear that attorney fees are awardable as special
damages for a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, % 122, 65 P.3d 1134 ("[B]reach of a fiduciary obligation is a
well-established exception to the American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases
generally."), rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Kealamakia, Inc. v.
Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, f 7, 213 P.3d 13 (same); Staffing Am., Inc. v. Advanced
Mzmt. Concepts, Inc., 2005 UT App 437, 2005 WL 2600637, at *2 (Utah Ct. App. Oct.
14, 2005) ("Campbell broadly approved the awarding of attorney fees as damages for the

9

breach of a fiduciary duty . . .."). Thus, the Jury was acting in accordance with its
instructions and the law when it awarded Branson his attorney fees as special damages.5
Fifth, Marvin's argument gainsays the law of sister jurisdictions. Indeed, the vast
majority of states are in accord with Utah's rule that attorney fees may be awarded as
special damages for slander of title. See, e.g., Paidar v. Hughes, 615 N.W.2d 276, 280
(Minn. 2000) ("The clear majority of states that have considered this issue hold,
consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633(1 )(b) (1977), that attorney fees
are special damages in a slander of title action." (emphases added)); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp.. 419 S.E.2d 870, 881 (W. Va. 1992) ("We follow the clear majority
rule in holding that attorneys' fees incurred in removing spurious clouds from a title
qualify as special damages in an action for slander of title." (emphases added) (citing the
Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Dowse, 208 P.2d 956T).6
Sixth, Marvin's argument is illogical. Marvin speculates that the Jury mistakenly
awarded Branson special damages on his slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty
claims. The Court cannot simply presume the Jury made an error in filling out the
Special Verdict when the most reasonable interpretation is that the Jury purposefully

5

Strangely, Marvin argues that Branson cannot obtain his attorney fees as special
damages unless some other category of special damages is also awarded. As discussed
above, and consistent with Utah law, Branson's attorney fees are the special damages
Marvin claims are lacking.
6

Indeed, according to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, "fo]nly Texas requires proof of
the loss of a particular sale to establish special damages." Paidar v. Hughes, 615 N.W.2d
276, 280 (Minn. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing Clark v. Lewis, 684 S.W.2d 161. 164
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984)). Thus, in addition to the clear imperative of Utah law, the
overwhelming weight of authority affirms that the Jury properly awarded Branson his
attorney fees as special damages on his slander of title claim.
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answered the special verdict. See,e.g., Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah
1974) (reiterating rule that, following trial, "all presumptions are in favor of the validity
of the verdict" (emphasis added)).
Additionally, Marvin does not explain how, if the Jury's responses were by
mistake (which they were not), the Jury made the same mistake twice with respect to
Branson, and not once in response to the same questions posed with respect to Marvin.
See R. 9792-94 (awarding Marvin no attorney fees as special damages on his slander of
title and breach of fiduciary duty claims). Nor does Marvin explain why others of the
Jury's responses on the Special Verdict (such as those favorable to him) were not also
mistaken.
Perhaps most telling, Marvin does not address the one mistake that the Jury
actually made, but specifically corrected in answering the Special Verdict. In particular,
the Jury inadvertently answered Question 14(C). See R. 9793. Realizing that no answer
was called for, the Jury's Foreperson crossed out and initialed the Jury's inadvertent
answer as shown below:

11

MARVIN'S SLANDER OF TITLE CLAIM

QUESTION NO. 14: Does the jury find by clear and convincing evidence that Branson slandered
title to Marvin's property?
Yes

No

n

(A) If the jury answered Question No. 14 as "Yes," the jury must give judgment in favor of Marvin
and against Branson on Marvin's slander of title claim, and hereby awards damages to Marvin in the
amount of $

. If the jury answered this question, then proceed to answer Question

No. 14(C).

(B) If the jury answered Question No. 14 as "No," thejury has givenjudgment in favor of Branson
and against Marvin on Marvin's slander of title claim. Proceed to Question No. 15.

(C) If the jury awarded Marvin damages under paragraph (A), does the jury find that Branson
should be held to pay Marvin's attorney ^es?^P f
Yes

No^_

Proceed to question No. 15.

R. 9793. The Jury's clear recognition and specific correction of that mistake
demonstrates that its other responses were no mistake.
To paraphrase the principle contained in Occam's Razor, the simplest explanation
is usually the correct one. That principle is apt here; the Jury's verdict is as intended, and
Marvin's implausible scenario of multiple coincidences and blunders must fail. See
Mueller v. Allen, 2005 UT App 477 f 2, 128 P.3d 18.
Seventh, Marvin's interpretation of the Jury's verdict is contrary to the testimony
of the Jury's Foreperson. In his affidavit (the "Foreperson Affidavit"), the Jury's
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Foreperson makes clear that the Jury's responses to Question Nos. 6(C) and 8(C) were
not mistakes. SeeR. 10556-58.7
In particular, among other things, the Foreperson testified that, in accordance with
the Jury instructions and law, "[t]he Jury specifically and intentionally awarded Branson .
. . his attorney fees as . . . damages for the slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty
claims." R. 10556 & 10558 (emphasis added). On the other hand, the Foreperson made
clear that "[t]he Jury specifically and intentionally declined to award Marvin any attorney
fees because Marvin lost and we did not think Marvin was entitled to his attorney fees as
damages." R. 10557 (emphases added). The Foreperson also confirmed that the Jury did
not "calculate Branson's attorney fees," because the Court instructed the Jury that "the
Court would calculate them after [their] verdict." R. 10557. Thus, Marvin's claim of
mistake is not well taken based on the law or evidence.
Finally, the Jury's verdict has substantial support in the evidence. Evidence that
Branson incurred attorney fees to cure Marvin's slander of title and breach of fiduciary
duty was admitted during trial. See, e.g., R. 9796-10184, 10343-77, 10386-535, &

7

Marvin has argued that the Foreperson's Affidavit is inadmissible under Utah Rule of
Evidence 606(b). However, in response to case law, the federal counterpart to Utah Rule
of Evidence 606(b) was recently amended to expressly permit a juror affidavit like the
one at issue in this case, stating "a juror may testify about... whether there was a
mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form." Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) (emphasis
added); cf. Utah R. Evid. 606(b), advisory committee note (observing that Utah R. Evid.
606(b) "is the federal rule, verbatim"); West Valley City y. Hutto. 2000 UT App 188, f 12
n.3, 5 P.3d 1 ("Utah courts may look to the federal advisory committee notes as well as
federal court interpretation of the federal rules to aid in interpreting the Utah rules."
(quoting State v. Kinross, 906 P.2d 320, 324 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (additional quotations
and citation omitted)). Thus, the Foreperson's Affidavit is admissible to refute Marvin's
allegation that the Jury mistakenly awarded Branson his attorney fees as special damages.
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10378-85; R. 11486 at 237-39, 250-52, 274, & 281-84; R. 11487 at 289-92, 296, 301302, & 317-19.
For example, evidence adduced at trial showed that Marvin's slander of Branson's
title was not corrected until after years of expensive litigation. See, e.g., R. 11486 at 113,
148-50, 163-64, 174-75, 177, 182-83, 185, 192-94, 227-28; R. 11487 at 429, 446-48,
462-64, 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 and 839-42. The Jury was entitled to find, and did so
find that, but for this lawsuit, Marvin would never have cured his slander.
Marvin's claim that his slander of Branson's title was a mistake or corrected was
necessarily rejected by the Jury. See R. 9789-91. Indeed, to find Marvin liable for
slandering Branson's title, the Jury had to find that Marvin acted with malice. See R.
9776 (enumerating malice element of slander of title claim). More particularly, the jury
necessarily found that Marvin intended "to injure, vex, or annoy" Branson, or that Marvin
"knowingly and wrongfully" recorded "something untrue or spurious or which gives a
false or misleading impression adverse to one's title under circumstance that it should
reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property." First Sec. Bank
of Utah N.A. v. Banberry Crossing 780P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989). In light of the
Jury's inescapable finding of malice, Marvin's excuses are of no weight.
Moreover, the fact that Branson incurred attorney fees to remedy Marvin's slander
of title and breach of fiduciary duty is axiomatic because Branson was obviously
represented by counsel at trial. Furthermore, Branson's attorney fees are still being

incurred, through this appeal. Thus, Marvin's complaint that the Jury did not receive
evidence regarding Branson's attorney fees is not well taken.9 Furthermore, the trial
court did not allow this evidence, telling the Jury that the trial court would decide the
amount of the special damages. See R. 9771.
In sum, under the highly deferential standard, and in light of the applicable law, it
cannot be reasonably said that the Jury mistakenly awarded Branson his attorney fees as
special damages.

The cases cited by Marvin for the proposition that other actual damages must be
awarded before attorney fees can be awarded for breach of fiduciary duty do not stand for
that proposition at all. For instance, Free Motion Fitness, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank West,
NA, 2009 UT App 120, 208 P.3d 1066, actually stated that attorney fees were not
recoverable under the terms of a written indemnity agreement. See id at f 24.
Furthermore, because the case at bar does not involve an indemnity agreement, that case
is inapposite.
As another example, Marvin cites Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992). However,
that case dealt with the prevailing party inquiry, which is not relevant to Branson's issues
on appeal. Therefore, Farrar does not aid Marvin's zirgument. On the other hand,
Farrar is relevant to Marvin's remaining issue on appeal - whether the trial court erred in
finding that Marvin was not the prevailing party. Because Marvin's damages were
nominal, under Farrar, even if Marvin persuaded this Court that the trial court abused its
discretion in its prevailing party inquiry, Marvin's reasonable fee would be "no fee at
all." Id
Finally, Marvin cites Utah Medical Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates,
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1315 (D. Utah 1999). That case is inapposite, for several
reasons. First, that case only stands for the undisputed proposition that damages are a
necessary element of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See id. Second, the plaintiff in
that case could not demonstrate any injury because the alleged breach of duty was
incapable of causing injury, under the circumstances of that case. See id. Third, that case
dealt with a motion for summary judgment, rather than an attack of a jury's verdict.
Fourth, the portion of the opinion relied upon by Marvin is dicta. See id. Finally, that
case was decided before the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Campbell v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, which is controlling, and
ruled that "breach of a fiduciary obligation is a well-established exception to the
American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases generally." Id. at *§ 122. Thus, the
Clinical Innovations case unhelpful to Marvin.
9

Marvin appears to confuse the Jury's award of Branson's attorney fees as special
damages with attorney fees awardable to a prevailing party under contract. To be clear,
Branson's entitlement to attorney fees at issue in this appeal relate to his specific award
of special damages by the Jury, not to a contractual prevailing party fee provision.
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C.

Marvin's "Other Reasons" Likewise Fail

Marvin also claims there are two "other reasons" why the JNOV was proper.
First, Marvin argues that his slander of title to Branson's property was without the
requisite malice. Second, Marvin argues that the trial court treated Branson's breach of
fiduciary duty claim as a mere breach of contract. However, those two additional
arguments are nothing more than non-marshalled challenges of the sufficiency of the
evidence, improperly raised for the first time on appeal. In any event, neither of these
"other reasons" has merit.
1.

Marvin's Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence Showing His
Malice Is Not Well Taken.

Both the controlling substantive law and Jury instructions, required the Jury to
specifically find that Marvin acted with malice, in order to find for Branson on his
slander of title claim. See First Sec. Bank of Utah v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253,
1256-57 (Utah 1989) ("To prove slander of title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was
a publication of a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) the statement
was false, (3) the statement was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused actual or
special damages."); Spencer v. Pleasant View City, 2003 UT App 379, | 23, 80 P.3d 546
(same). See R. 9776 (identifying malice as necessary element of slander of title).
Marvin's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the malice element is
not well taken.
First, Marvin's argument is new - raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, it
should be summarily rejected. See, e.g., Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc.,
2003 UT 2 3 4 19, 70P.3d904 ("We will not address any new arguments raised for the
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first time on appeal." (additional quotations and citations omitted)); Coombs v. Juice
Works Dev. Inc., 2003 UT App 388, % 6 n.6, 81 P.3d 769 (same).
Second, Marvin has again failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Jury's
verdict before attacking it. Thus, the Court can and should summarily reject this
challenge on marshalling grounds. See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789,
799 (Utah 1991) ("To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury
verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the
verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict." (emphasis added)).
Third, the Jury necessarily found that Marvin acted maliciously,10 when it found,
"by clear and convincing evidence," that Marvin slandered title to Branson's property,
and completed the Special Verdict. R. 9789.
Finally, at trial, Branson adduced significant evidence of Marvin's malice. For
example, contrary to the brothers' agreement and the buyout plan created by their
attorney Travis Bowen, Marvin personally took and recorded inaccurate and
unauthorized deeds that divested Branson of his ownership to the Farm, including
Branson's home. See R. 11486 at 163-64. The Farm and Branson's home were never
intended to go to Marvin, so Marvin's claim of joint ownership is incorrect. Over the
following four years of contentious litigation, Marvin refused to return title to the Farm
10

In the slander of title context, u[m]alice may be implied where a party knowingly and
wrongfully records or publishes something untrue or spurious or which gives a false or
misleading impression adverse to one's title under circumstances that it should
reasonably foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property." First Sec. Bank
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and failed even to respond to Branson's many impassioned requests to cure the slander.
See, e.g., R. 11486 at 113, 148-50, 174-75, 177, 182-83, 185, 192-94, & 227-28; R.
11487 at 429, 446-48, 462-64, & 468-73; R. 11489 at 805 & 839-42. Marvin even
rejected the following written warning from his own attorney that his slander could rise
to the level of criminal conduct:
Some time ago you executed a deed from Steelwater conveying both the house and the farm
property to Branson and his wife, and you left this deed in our possession with instructions not to
release it or have it recorded without your authorization. We know of no legal justification for you
to continue to withhold your authorization for the recording of this deed, and, for your own
protection, we recommend that it be recorded without further delay. If it is not recorded, a civil
action could be brought against you, and it is also possible, though not likely, that a criminal charge
could brought. (Although it is not your intent to take the farm property, that may appear to be your
intent, and this could expose you to the risk of a criminal charge. We do not believe that such a
charge is likely or that it would be justified, but we want you to be aware that it is a risk.)
Trial Ex. 228; see also R. 11487 at 472. Marvin's attempts to excuse his malicious
conduct through claims of clerical error and prior correction were necessarily rejected by
the Jury. See R. 9789-90. Additionally, Marvin himself claimed that the purportedly
corrective deeds were forged by someone at Bowen's office, which the Jury plainly
rejected. See R. 11489 at 844 & 852-55. In short, substantial evidence was admitted at
trial showing that Marvin acted with malice.
2.

Marvin's Argument that the Trial Court Treated Branson's Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Claim as Only a Breach of Contract Is Not Well
Taken.

Marvin's argument that Branson's breach of fiduciary duty claim was treated by
the trial court as a mere breach of contract is also not well taken.

of Utah, N.A. v. Banbeiry Crossing* 780 P.2d 1253. 1257 (Utah 1989); RJW Media, Inc.
v. CIT Group/Consumer Fin., Inc., 2008 UT App 476, If 25. 202 P.3d 291 (same).
1R

Initially, as with Marvin's first "other reason," his second argument is brand new
on appeal, and should therefore be summarily rejected. See, e.g., Smith, 2003 UT 23 at
If 19; Coombs, 2003 UT App 388 at 1 6 n.6.
Additionally, Marvin's argument is contrary to the events at trial. Both Branson's
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract claims were submitted to the Jury. See
R. 9788 & 9790-91. Further, the Jury was separately instructed regarding the two
different claims, which may be concurrently maintained. See R. 9771 and 9776-77.
Finally, Marvin waived any challenge to submission of those two distinct claims
to the Jury. Indeed, Marvin did not object to or appeal submission of those claims to the
Jury. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Cornm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
(concluding defendant waived challenge to issues submitted to jury on special verdict
form by failing "to timely make a specific objection on the record before the jury retired
to consider its verdict").
In sum, Marvin's confusing argument that the trial court somehow eliminated
Branson's breach of fiduciary duty claim, despite submitting the same to the Jury, is
without merit.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON BRANSON'S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM BECAUSE
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST.
A.

Marvin Incorrectly Presents the Facts and Inferences.

In reviewing the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment against Branson
on his malicious prosecution claim against Marvin, the Court must review the facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to Branson, affording the trial court no deference.
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See, e.g., Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, If 16, 215 P.3d 933 ("We review a
district court's decision to grant summary judgment for correctness, granting no
deference to the district court's conclusions, and we view the facts and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.").
Once again, Marvin violates the applicable standard of review, and improperly
presents the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to him, the moving party.
Also, Marvin relies heavily on the trial court's ruling, which as a matter of law, is
afforded no deference. See id_ Thus, in reviewing the trial court's grant of partial
summary judgment for correctness, the Court must disregard Marvin's improper and selfserving statements of fact regarding the malicious prosecution. Rather, the Court must
review the facts and inferences as presented by Branson. [See Appellant's Brief at 1923].
B.

Marvin Improperly Raises New Issues on Appeal.

The trial court granted Marvin's motion for partial summary judgment on
Branson's malicious prosecution claim, based on Marvin's argument that there were no
genuine issues of material fact regarding the second and third elements of the tort - "(2)
defendants did not have probable cause to initiate the prosecution; [and] (3) defendants
initiated the proceedings primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender
to justice." Hodses v. Gibson, 811 P.2d 15K 156 (Utah 1991). SeeR. 8721-22.
Nevertheless, for the first time on appeal, Marvin also challenges the first and
fourth elements of malicious prosecution - "(1) defendants initiated or procured the
initiation of criminal proceedings against an innocent plaintiff;.. . and (4) the

?0

proceedings terminated in favor of the accused." See Hodges, 811 P.2d at 156. The
Court should disregard and summarily reject Marvin's new arguments. See, e.g., Smith
v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.% Inc., 2003 UT 23, % 19, 70 P.3d 904 ("We will not
address any new arguments raised for the first time on appeal." (additional quotations
and citations omitted)); Coombs v. Juice Works Dev. Inc., 2003 UT App 388, Tf 6 n.6, 81
P.3d 769 (same).
C.

Marvin's New Arguments Fail.

Even if the Court went beyond Marvin's argument below and the trial court's
partial summary judgment ruling (which it should not), Marvin's new arguments still fail.
1.

Marvin Initiated or Procured the Initiation of the Criminal
Proceedings.

Turning to Marvin's first new argument and the first element of malicious
prosecution, Marvin initiated or procured the initiation of the criminal proceedings by
giving false information to law enforcement. See Hodges, 811 P.2d at 158 (ruling that
defendant satisfied the first malicious prosecution element by giving false information to
law enforcement); Bhatia v. Debek, 948 A.2d 1009, 1018-19 (Conn. 2008) (noting that
the initiation element provides no shelter to persons who knowingly provide public
officers with false information). In particular, as shown by the affidavit of eye-witness
and neighbor, Maurice Carter, Marvin fabricated his story about the relevant incident and
tampered with witnesses who contradicted his prevarication. See R. 7946, 794950, &
11490-92.
To the extent the plain meaning of the first malicious prosecution element leaves
the Court with any doubt that Marvin's conduct satisfies the first element, the
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commentary from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was favorably cited by the
Utah Supreme Court in Hodges, further refutes Marvin's new argument. See 811 P.2dat
156 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 (1977)). The Restatement commentary
provides guidance on both of the independent methods to satisfy the first malicious
prosecution element. The Restatement provides the following insight on the "procures
the initiation" method:
[0]ne who procures a third person to institute criminal proceedings against
another is liable under the same conditions as though he had himself
initiated the proceedings. A person who does not himself initiate criminal
proceedings may procure their institution in one of two ways: (1) by
inducing a third person, either a private person or a public prosecutor, to
initiate them, or (2) by prevailing upon a public official to institute them by
filing an information. . . . One who gives to a third person, whether public
official or private person, information of another's supposed criminal
conduct or even accuses the other person of the crime, causes the institution
of such proceedings as are brought by the third person.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 cmt. d (emphases added). Here, because Marvin
gave law enforcement information of Branson's supposed criminal conduct and accused
Branson of a crime, Marvin's conduct satisfies the first malicious prosecution element.
Marvin tries to hide behind the government's decision to prosecute, however, as a
matter of law, a party who gives knowingly false information to a prosecutor initiates the
proceeding and negates the prosecutor's exercise of discretion. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 653 cmt. g ("If, however, the information is known by the giver to be
false, an intelligent exercise of the officer's discretion becomes impossible, and a
prosecution based upon it is procured by the person giving the false information.")

(emphases added)). Thus, at a minimum, whether Marvin initiated or procured the
initiation of the criminal proceeding is a disputed issue of material fact.
2.

The Criminal Proceedings Terminated in Favor of Branson as a
Matter of Law.

With respect to Marvin's second new argument and the fourth malicious
prosecution element, the criminal proceedings terminated in favor of Branson as a matter
of law. Marvin incorrectly claims that Branson pleaded guilty to the criminal charge at
issue. In reality, the prosecutor dismissed the charges relating to the January 26, 2005
incident, on her own initiative. See R. 7151-58. The prosecutor's dismissal of the
criminal proceeding satisfies the fourth and final element of malicious prosecution claim.
See Hodges, 811 P.2d at 161 ("A favorable termination of a criminal prosecution occurs,
inter alia, when the proceedings against the accused are dismissed by 'the formal
abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor . . . . ' " (omission in original)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 659(c) (1977))). Thus, beyond simply
demonstrating a disputed issue of material fact, Branson satisfies the fourth element of
his malicious prosecution claim as a matter of law.
In sum, the Court should summarily reject the two new malicious prosecution
arguments raised by Marvin for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, even if the Court
failed to reject Marvin's new arguments out of hand, they still fail on the merits.
D.

Marvin Lacked Probable Cause.

Marvin argues that, because the criminal authorities found probable cause to
prosecute and bind over Branson for trial, Branson's malicious prosecution claim fails as
a matter of law. That argument is not well taken, for several reasons.
23

1.

Marvin Does Not Refute Branson's Arguments.

Tellingly, Marvin does not even address the law or arguments raised in Branson's
opening brief, which arguments show the fatal flaws in Marvin's analysis. In short, those
unchallenged arguments are as follows: (1) the probable cause element requires a
showing that Marvin, not the criminal authorities, lacked probable cause to initiate the
prosecution; (2) the criminal magistrate's bindover is irrelevant; (3) the Utah Supreme
Court has explicitly rejected Defendants' argument11; and (4) Defendants' position is
illogical and, if accepted, would effectively eliminate the tort of malicious prosecution.
[See Appellant's Brief at 37-40].
2.

Marvin Selectively Ignores Evidence that He Lacked Probable
Cause.

In addition to incorrectly presenting the facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to him, Marvin simply ignores evidence that shows he lacked probable cause.
For instance, evidence admitted below showed that Marvin lied to the police in making
his criminal complaint. See R. 3709, 7124, 7944-58 & 11490-92. That evidence of
Marvin relies on Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 838 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). However, that case is easily distinguished. For example, in contrast to the
defendants in Callioux, the evidence here shows that Marvin lied to the police in making
his criminal complaint. See R. 3709, 7124, 7944-58 & 11490-92. In Olson v.
Independent Order of Foresters, 324 P.2d 1012 (Utah 1958), the Utah Supreme Court
stated "that proof of fraud, perjury or other undue means in procuring a magistrate to bind
over a plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution would overcome any presumption
of probable cause for such binding over." See id. at 1013. Further, unlike the situation in
Callioux, evidence shows that Marvin attempted to conceal his lie and intimidate
witnesses. See R. 7949-50 & 11491-92. Additionally, unlike Marvin, the defendant in
Callioux "was mandated [by statute] to report" its suspicions, which were reasonable.
See 745 P.2d at 843. Finally, to the extent it is inconsistent with Branson's argument, it
is superseded by Hodges v. Gibson, 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991). which was decided by the
Utah Supreme Court after Callioux, and wherein the court affirmed a malicious
prosecution judgment in favor or the plaintiff, even though the plaintiff had been "bound
over for a t r i a l . . . [fallowing a preliminary hearing," necessarily based on the
magistrate's finding of probable cause. See 811 P.2d at 155.
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prevarication undoubtedly overcomes "any presumption of probable cause." Olson v.
Independent Order of Foresters. 324 P.2d 1012, 1013 (Utah 1958). Additionally,
evidence showed that Marvin attempted to conceal his lie and intimidate witnesses. See
R. 7949-50 & 11491-92.
In sum, at a minimum, the evidence admitted below creates a genuine issue of
disputed material fact regarding whether Marvin had probable cause.
E.

Marvin Initiated the Proceeding Primarily for a Purpose Other Than
That of Bringing an Offender to Justice.

Marvin's only challenge to the third malicious prosecution element is his claim
that Branson did not submit sufficient evidence that Marvin initiated the criminal
proceeding primarily for a purpose other than that of brining an offender to justice.
Again, Marvin's argument is not well taken.
Marvin again selectively discounts evidence showing his malice.

Apparently,

according to Marvin, the only way Branson could create an issue of fact regarding
Marvin's intent is if Marvin admitted his ill intent. Fortunately, the law permits malice to
be proven by circumstantial evidence of a "wrongful or improper motive." Johnson v.
Mount Osden Enters., 23 Utah 2d 169, 460 P.2d 333, 335 (1969). An attempt to
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As discussed above, Marvin again improperly clings to the trial court's
pronouncements, which for this issue on appeal, are afforded no deference. See Bodell
Constr. Co, v. Robbins* 2009 UT 52, f 16, 215 P.3d 933. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
the trial court also appears to have turned the applicable standard on its head, when it
declared that the Carter Affidavit was not "conclusive" or "sufficient proof of malice."
R. 8722. Thus, the trial court improperly weighed the evidence offered in opposition to
Marvin's motion for partial summary juagment. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo,
888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995) ("On a motion for summary judgment, a trial court
should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material
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"retaliate" is a classic example of such malicious conduct. Aeler v. Scheidle, 2006 UT
App 495. 2006 WL 3647393, at *2 (Utah Ct. ADD. Dec. 14, 2006). Here, Branson
presented the trial court with evidence that Marvin's primary purpose in initiating the
criminal proceeding against Branson was to retaliate for and exert pressure in this
litigation. See R. 7151-58. Thus, there was sufficient evidence of Marvin's malice to, at
minimum, create a genuine dispute as to a material issue of fact, which precludes entry of
summary judgment. In sum, the Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment against Branson on his malicious prosecution claim.
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The parties agree that Branson's original statement of jurisdiction is correct.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Although Marvin initially appealed three issues, the parties resolved Marvin's
final two issues by stipulation. [See Suggestion of Mootness, on file with the Court].
Thus, only Marvin's first issue - the attorney fee issue - remains on cross-appeal.
To further narrow the focus of the Court's inquiry, there is no dispute that several
of the documents signed by the parties contained attorney fee provisions. See, e.g., R.
9801, 10884-89, & 11208-23. Thus, the only issue on cross-appeal is whether the trial
court erred in determining that Marvin was not the prevailing party. That issue is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, f 25, 40

issues of fact exist."); Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 2006 UT App 500, f 15, 153
P.3d 798 (same).
iz

P.3d 1119 ("Which party is the prevailing party is an aippropriate question for the trial
court. This question depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case, and,
therefore, it is appropriate to leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial
court. We therefore review the trial court's determination as to who was the prevailing
party under an abuse of discretion standard."); Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App
266, f 10, 139 P.3d 1073 (stating that "the district court's determination as to the identity
of the prevailing party is reviewed for abuse of discretion").
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
In violation of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5), Marvin failed to
include "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or
"a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court."
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case can perhaps best be described as a 'business divorce.' After running his

construction business for years, Branson hired his much-younger brother, Marvin, hoping
to bring him into the family business. However, after a number of years, the brothers'
business and personal relationship deteriorated, and Branson ultimately left the company
he started.
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Rather than resulting in a clean break, the buyout process uncovered Marvin's
corporate malfeasance and generated more controversy. Marvin's failure to abide by the
buyout procedure developed by their mutual attorney, Travis Bowen, forced Branson to
file this lawsuit. In retaliation, Marvin filed a number of counterclaims, seeking far more
damages than Branson sought in his initial complaint. Moreover, during the course of the
litigation, Marvin manipulated the criminal justice system to open up additional fronts in
his attack on Branson.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
From the beginning of this case, Branson and Marvin asserted similar claims

against each other. Branson calculated his damages to be in excess of $1,150,000.
Marvin sought even more, seeking over $1,500,000 in damages from Branson.
After years of expensive, contentious, and hard-fought litigation, the case went to
trial. Nearly identical claims were submitted by Branson and Marvin to the Jury. During
and near the end of trial, Marvin suddenly slashed and abandoned his damages request
from over $1,500,000 to just $2.00. The Jury awarded Branson $9,001.00, plus his
attorney fees as special damages on two of his claims. Those special damages are in
excess of $377,000. By contrast, the Jury awarded Marvin only $2.00.
Following the trial, during a proceeding sometimes referred to as the "Manilla
Ranch Case," certain remaining issues, sometimes referred to as the "Manilla Ranch" or
"Estate" issues, were resolved by stipulation "without finding breach of fiduciary duty or
otherwise." R. 11357 (emphasis added).

In both the main and Manilla Ranch matters, Marvin repeatedly sought his
attorney fees under a prevailing party theory. However, the trial court repeatedly
declined to find Marvin was the prevailing party. Instead, the trial court found that
neither party was the prevailing party. In his cross-appeal, Marvin seeks review of the
trial court's prevailing party determination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

THE PARTIES' CLAIMS
Branson and Marvin asserted a number of mirroring claims against each other

relating to the same transactions or occurrences. See, e.g., R. 1-32 & 1605-23. Marvin
sought special damages of approximately $1,500,000., and Branson sought special
damages of approximately $1,150,000.13 See R. 263, 8582-88.
After asserting his claims for years, Marvin suddenly voluntarily withdrew most of
his claims against Branson shortly "before the matter was submitted to the jury."
R. 11352. Thus, with the exception of an additional claim by Branson for breach of a
"salary continuation agreement," the only claims submitted to the Jury were symmetrical
claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
assault, slander of title, and breach of fiduciary duty. See R. 9788-94.
During and near the end of trial, when Branson was almost certain to be the victor,
Marvin suddenly reduced his damages figure to $2.00. Marvin's abandonment of all but
de minimus damages occurred after Branson had shattered Marvin's case and credibility
13

Marvin incorrectly claims that Branson sought over $5,304,070 in damages. [See Brief
of Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 7]. A review of Marvin's record citations reveals that
statement to be untrue. See R. 1-32 & 8581-84. While it is unclear how Marvin reached
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by, among other things, impeaching Marvin with his prior inconsistent statements
multiple times, exposing Marvin's evasive answers and demeanor in the face of cross
examination, uncovering Marvin's bias, impeaching Marvin's witnesses with their prior
inconsistent statements, confronting Marvin and his witnesses with documents that
contradicted their testimony, and uncovering the biases of Marvin's witnesses. Thus,
from the beginning of this action until literally the final hours of trial, Marvin sought over
$1,500,000.00 from Branson, only to completely abandon $1,499,998.00 of his damages
claims in a last minute, strategic decision. See R. 263.
II.

THE OUTCOME OF THE PARTIES' CLAIMS
On February 5, 2007, the Jury returned its verdict. See R. 9788-91. The Jury

awarded Marvin a total of $2.00. See R. 9792. On the other hand, the Jury awarded
Branson $9,001.00, plus his attorney fees as special damages on his slander of title and
breach of fiduciary duty claims. See R. 9788-91. Those special damages exceed
$377,000, and are the subject of Branson's appeal. See R. 9805, 9847, & 10397. Thus,
the Jury awarded Branson over $385,000.
On August 29, 2007, Manilla Ranch issues were bifurcated and resolved by way
of a hearing and stipulation. See R. 11353. On July 25, 2008, the trial court
memorialized the stipulations, "without finding breach of fiduciary duty or otherwise."
R. 11357 (emphasis added).
Subsequently, during the pendency of this appeal, the parties stipulated to the split
of the monies in the trial court's trust account. [See Suggestion of Mootness].
his grossly exaggerated figure, what is clear is that Marvin sought more special damages
ic\

III.

THE TRIAL COURT REPEATEDLY RULED MARVIN WAS NOT THE
"PREVAILING PARTY" UNDER THE CONTRACTUAL ATTORNEY FEE
PROVISIONS OR OTHERWISE.
Several of the relevant agreements between Branson and Marvin contained

provisions whereby the prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees. See, e.g., R. 44, 57,
70, & 11190. Both parties sought their attorney fees as the prevailing party (although
Branson is also entitled to his attorney fees as special damages for his slander of title and
breach of fiduciary duty claims). See, e.g., R. 9801, 10884-89, & 11208-23.
On November 6, 2007, the trial court ruled that neither party was the "prevailing
party" for the purposes of awarding attorney fees under contract theories. See R. 1119091. Specifically, the trial court ruled as follows:
The contractual language indicated that the prevailing party may be
awarded attorney fees. The Jury found that both parties prevailed on the
Breach of Contract and that both parties breached their contractual
obligations. The Jury awarded Plaintiff $9,000.00 and the Jury found $1.00
for Defendant.
Even though Defendant reserved attorney's fees to be determined at
the end of trial the Court finds that neither party is justified in receiving
attorney's fees in regards to the breach of contract issue. The Court finds
that even if the parties were justified in receiving attorney's fees, the fees
would offset one another.
Therefore, Attorney's fees in regards to the breach of contract issue
will not be awarded to either party,
R. 11190-91 (emphases added).14
On July 25, 2009, the trial court reiterated that its November 6, 2007
Memorandum Decision denied either party attorney fees under the prevailing party
than Branson. Compare R. 263, with R. 8582-88.
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analysis. See R. 11349. Again, the trial court expressly examined and rebuked Marvin's
argument that he was the prevailing party, ruling as follows:
The case law supplied by the Defendant is persuasive and a flexible
and reasoned in [sic] approach is appropriate. However this entire,
unfortunate lawsuit arises not so much out of a breach of contract or proven
non-breach, but rather out of the tragic breakdown of family relationships,
convoluted, complicated and infused with emotion, both healthy and
unfortunately unhealthy. To case the whole controversy as one of breach of
contract, though there was a contract and to consider or not consider the
other claims does not adequately describe or address the terrible mess these
two brothers created for themselves. The attorneys fees expended and
incurred on both sides are enormous, the time and energy spent, the
precious family ties and relationships lost, the public's forum and taxes,
money wasted can only be adequately described as a disaster. The only
feasible and reasoned decision relative to attorney's fees is that neither
party prevailed, both suffered irreparable loss and this Court refuses to
compound the loss by awarding fees to either party.
The jury's award of nine thousand dollars ($9,000.00) for breach of
contract to the Plaintiff as well as [its] award of one dollar ($1.00) to the
Defendant are both unsupportable and without basis under the facts of the
case. Though the Court will not sua sponte set them aside, nor solicit or
entertain motions to do so, the Court is not bound by the award to find
therefrom a "prevailing party["] in this catastrophic litigation, and no fees
to either side are awarded.
The Defendant has also sought his Pre-trial attorney fees and costs as
they relate to the Aspen Springs/ABCO portion of this bifurcated action.
He seeks these under both the language of the contractus), the outcome of
the litigation, both ultimately and on various Pre-trial motions and pursuant
to Rule 54 (d) U.R.C.P. (costs) and under § 78-27-50.5 UCA. The Court
questions the application of the provisions of the Code section to this
action, but regardless, the Court for the reasons above stated declines to
award fees. As no fees are awarded the issues of whether the fees were
properly applied for and [sic] will not be addressed.
R. 11353 (emphases added).

14

The Court should note that under this scenario, Branson was 9,000 times more
successful than Marvin.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court should not disturb the trial court's prevailing party determination, for a
number of reasons. First, Marvin failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's factual finding that he is not the prevailing party. That failure is fatal to his crossappeal. Second, the trial court repeatedly and expressly considered and rejected Marvin's
argument, despite Marvin's claims to the contrary. Third, Marvin failed to preserve and
thereby waived his challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court's findings. Finally, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Marvin was not the prevailing
party. Thus, the Court should affirm that trial court's prevailing party determination and
resulting denial of Marvin's request for attorney fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE TRIAL COURT'S
"PREVAILING PARTY" DETERMINATION AND RESULTING DENIAL
OF MARVIN'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES,
Marvin seeks his attorney fees under a prevailing party theory. Thus, Marvin's

entitlement to attorney fees was conditioned upon the trial court deeming him the
prevailing party, which it repeatedly declined to do. Marvin asks the Court to reverse
those rulings.
A.

Marvin Again Failed to Marshal the Evidence.

Marvin's failure to marshal does not end with the issues appealed by Branson.
Marvin also bears the burden to marshal with respect to the issue he appeals.
It is well settled that the prevailing party determination is a factual finding,
requiring Marvin to marshal the evidence supporting it, before attacking it. See, e.g.,
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Levin v. Carlton. 2009 UT App 170. ^ 26. 213 P.3d 884 (affirming trial court's prevailing
party determination for purposes of contractual attorney fee provision, where party
challenging trial court's determination did not adequately marshal the evidence
supporting the trial court's determination); Crowley v. Black, 2007 UT App 245. f 6. 167
P.3d 1087 (stating that which party prevailed is a factual determination); Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) (requiring an appellant who wishes to challenge a factual finding to marshal the
evidence supporting that finding before attacking it).
Again, instead of marshalling the facts supporting the trial court's factual
determination that Marvin was not the prevailing party, Marvin incorrectly presents only
the select facts favorable to his position. [See Brief of Appellee and Cross Appellant at
18-23 & 59-65]. "That does not begin to meet the marshalling burden [Marvin] must
carry." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789. 800 (Utah 1991).
Marvin's failure to carry his marshalling burden is fatal to his appeal. Failure to
marshal results in an inadequate challenge to the trial court's factual determination that
Marvin was not the prevailing party. See Levin, 2009 UT App 170 at ^f 26. As a result,
the Court must "assume that the trial court was correct in determining that [Marvin was
not] the prevailing party below." Id_ Thus, the court should affirm the trial court's
prevailing party determination.

2A

B.

The Trial Court Considered and Rejected Marvin's Request for
Piecemeal Determination of "Prevailing Party."

Marvin would have the prevailing party determination broken up into as many
small determinations as necessary for him to be deemed the victor on some convoluted
fraction of the proceedings.
Marvin insists that the trial court failed to consider his request for piecemeal
adjudication of the prevailing party determination. On the contrary, the trial court
specifically considered and expressly rejected Marvin's incremental approach,
repeatedly. See R. 11349 & 11353. On November 6, 2007, the trial court declined to
find Marvin was the prevailing party, "[e]ven though Defendant reserved attorney's fees
to be determined at the end of trial." R. 11190. Later, the trial court again declined to
find that Marvin was the prevailing party on the so-called "Aspen Springs/ABCO"
portion of the litigation, stating:
The Defendant has also sought his Pre-trial attorney fees and costs as
they relate to the Aspen Springs/ABCO portion of this bifurcated action.
He seeks these under both the language of the contractus), the outcome of
the litigation, both ultimately and on various Pre-trial motions and pursuant
to Rule 54 (d) U.R.C.P. (costs) and under § 78-27-50.5 UCA. The Court
questions the application of the provisions of the Code section to this
action, but regardless, the Court for the reasons above stated declines to
award fees. As no fees are awarded the issues of whether the fees were
properly applied for and will not be addressed.
R. 11353 (emphases added). Thus, Marvin's claim that the trial court did not address his
argument rings hollow.
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C.

Marvin Waived Any Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Trial Court's
Findings.

Marvin challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's findings in denying his
request for attorney fees. That argument is not well taken for at least a couple of reasons.
First, because Marvin "did not object to the district court's lack of findings, [he]
waived any challenge to the sufficiency of those findings." Bergman v. Burke, 2009 UT
App 146. 2009 WL 1567636, at *2 n.2 (June 4, 2009) (per curiam) (citing 438 Main St. v.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 56, 99 P.3d 801). For Marvin to properly preserve his
complaint about the sufficiency of the trial court's findings, he needed "to specifically
raise [his] objections and to introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority that
the findings themselves were insufficiently detailed." 438 Main St., 2004 UT 72 at f 56,
That, Marvin failed to do. Based on those omissions, Marvin "did not raise this issue in
such a way as to afford [Judge Low] an opportunity to correct the alleged error." Id
Thus, Marvin "waived any argument regarding whether the district court's findings of
fact were sufficiently detailed." Id_
Also, Marvin "does not argue that the district court committed plain error." Id_
As such, the Court should "not consider whether the district court should have set forth
additional findings to support its conclusion." Id_
D.

The Trial Court's "Prevailing Party" Determination Should Stand,
1.

Marvin Must Show that Trial Court Abused its Discretion.

Even if the Court finds that Marvin's failure to marshal the evidence is not,
standing alone, fatal to his appeal (which it is), Marvin must satisfy a stringent standard
of review. To wit, the trial court's prevailing party determination will not be disturbed
^6

absent a showing by Marvin that the trial court abused its discretion. See R. T. Nielson
Co. v. Cook 2002 UT 1 h^T 25, 40 P.3d 1119 ("Which party is the prevailing party is an
appropriate question for the trial court. This question depends, to a large measure, on the
context of each case, and, therefore, it is appropriate to leave this determination to the
sound discretion of the trial court. We therefore review the trial court's determination as
to who was the prevailing party under an abuse of discretion standard."); Lunceford v.
Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, ^j 10, 139 P.3d 1073 (stating that "the district court's
determination as to the identity of the prevailing party is reviewed for abuse of
discretion"). As discussed infra, Marvin has not and cannot justify reversal of the trial
court's prevailing party determination.
2.

"A Flexible and Reasoned Approach" to the "Prevailing Party"
Determination.

As the trial court rightly ruled, see R. 11352, and Marvin correctly conceded, the
so-called "flexible and reasoned approach" to determining the prevailing party is
appropriate here because this is a complicated case. R. T. Nelson, 2002 UT 11 at Tf 24
(reiterating recognition of "the 'need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in
particular cases who actually is the prevailing party'" "in complicated cases involving
multiple claims and parties" (quoting Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551,
556 n.7-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) (additional quotations omitted)).
The flexible and reasoned approach permits "a case-by-case evaluation by the trial
court, and flexibility to handle circumstances where both, or neither, parties may be
considered to have prevailed." R. T. Nelson, 2002 UT 11 at f 25. The Utah Supreme
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Court has identified the following non-exhaustive, illustrative considerations that trial
courts may examine:
(1) contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, etc., brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative
to each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered
as a whole, and (4) the dollar amounts attached to and awarded in
connection with the various claims.
Id. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has left "it to the trial courts' discretion to decide
which additional common sense perspectives are most appropriate to consider in future
cases." A.K.&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guv, 2004 UT 47, Tf 26, 94 P.3d 270.
3.

The Trial Court Considered Appropriate Factors.

Viewed through the lens of the flexible and reasoned approach, the trial court's
prevailing party determination should be affirmed because the trial court's determination
that neither party was the "prevailing party" was based upon all of the appropriate
considerations, and then some.
First, the trial court expressly considered the contractual language, which provided
for attorney fees to the prevailing party. See R. 11190 ("The contractual language
indicated that the prevailing party may be awarded attorney fees. "). See R. T. Nielson,
2002 UT 11 at % 25 (identifying "contractual language" as one of four non-exhaustive
considerations that trial courts may look to in determining the prevailing party).
Second, the trial court considered the parties' respective claims. See R. 11190
(examining the parties' competing breach of contract claims) & 11351 ("The claims or
causes of action were variously styled, but all related to the separation of the two brothers
from a business relationship and the acrimony, misunderstandings, distrust[,] lack of
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communication and general discontent of the parties . . . ."). See R. T. Nielson, 2002 UT
11 at f 25 (identifying the "number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc., brought
by the parties" as a second illustrative consideration).
Third, the trial court considered relative the importance of the parties' claims. See
R. 11352 ("However this entire, unfortunate lawsuit arises not so much out of a breach of
contract or proven non-breach, but rather out of the tragic breakdown of family
relationships, convoluted, complicated and infused with emotion, both healthy and
unfortunately unhealthy. To cast the whole controversy as one of breach of contract,
though there was a contract and to consider or not consider the other claims does not
adequately describe or address the terrible mess these two brothers created for
themselves."). See R. T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11 at f 25 (identifying the "the importance of
the claims relative to each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit
considered as a whole" as the third possible consideration).
Fourth, the trial court considered the amounts awarded by the Jury. See R. 11190
"The Jury awarded Plaintiff $9,000.00 and the Jury found $1.00 for Defendant."); R.
11353 (same).15 See R. T. Nielson, 2002 UT 11 at If 25 (identifying the "the dollar
amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims" as the fourth
possible consideration). Relatedly, the trial court found that the Jury found that both
Branson and Marvin prevailed in their breach of contract claims. See R. 11190.

15

Actually, the trial court far underrepresented Branson's award because he excluded his
special damages on his slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty claims, which add
over $377,000 to Branson's recovery. See R. 9805, 9847, & 10397.
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Additionally, the trial court observed that the Jury found that both Branson and Marvin
breached their contractual obligations. See R. 11190.
In addition to the four considerations expressly set out in the R T. Neilson case, the
trial court also considered other considerations. For example, the trial court noted that, if
it were to find fees justified, the parties' attorney "fees would offset one another." R.
11190. Additionally, the trial court determined that an award of attorney fees under a
prevailing party theory would only "compound" the parties' irreparable losses. R. 11353.
4.

Other Considerations Support the Trial Court's Finding.

While Marvin trumpets his defensive efforts, it should be noted that Branson
successfully defended against Marvin's claims. Indeed, although Marvin sought more
damages from Branson than Branson sought from Marvin (that is until Marvin effectively
eliminated his damages in a mid-trial panic), Branson obtained a more favorable verdict.
Thus, whether viewed offensively or defensively, Branson faired better.
Marvin quotes statements by the trial court that reveal its unflattering view of the
entire dispute, including Branson's case. However, the trial court's unvarnished view of
Branson's case shows that, even despite apparent strong and unfavorable opinions of
Branson's case, the trial court still determined that Marvin was not the prevailing party.
In other words, if the trial court here did not see fit to deem Marvin the prevailing party,
then no other court could reasonably so find.
REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Branson respectfully requests double his costs and attorney fees on appeal,
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a). See Utah R. App. P. 33(a) ("Except
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in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or
appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages,
which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable
attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by
the party or by the party's attorney.").
As discussed above, Marvin wholly failed to carry his burden to marshal the
evidence supporting the Jury's verdict or the trial court's prevailing party determination.
Thus, the Court should sanction Marvin. See Barbery. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (finding party's arguments frivolous and without merit where party failed
to marshal "the relevant evidence" and awarding sanctions under Utah R. App. P. 33(a)).
Additionally, and also as discussed above, Marvin has not been forthright in his
presentation of the relevant facts. Marvin acted as though the Jury had not rejected the
very arguments he attempts to relitigate before this Court. Under similar circumstances,
the Utah Supreme Court has sanctioned parties under Rule 33 for such behavior, and
awarded the other party "double costs and reasonable compensation for the time and
labor they have expended defending against the appeal." DeBiy v. Cascade Enters., 935
P.2d 499, 503 (Utah 1997). The Court should do the same here, and award Branson
double costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Utah Supreme Court should (1) reverse the trial
court's grant of JNOV and reinstate the Jury's specific and express award of Branson's
attorney fees as special damages for his slander of title and breach of fiduciary duty
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claims; (2) reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on Branson's malicious
prosecution claim; (3) affirm the trial court's prevailing party determination and denial of
Marvin's request attorney fees; (4) award Branson double costs and attorney fees
incurred on appeal; and (5) remand this action to the trial court to award Branson his
costs and attorney fees and to hold a trial on the merits regarding Branson's malicious
prosecution claim.
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